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Cognitive radio is a promising technology aiming to improve the utilization of the radio electromagnetic spectrum. A cognitive
radio is a smart device which runs radio applications software to perform signal processing. The use of this software enables the
device to sense and understand its environment and actively change its mode of operation based on its observations. Unfortunately,
this solution entails new security challenges. In this paper, we present a cross-layer attack to TCP connections in cognitive radio
networks, analyze its impact on TCP throughput via analytical model and simulation, and propose potential countermeasures to
mitigate it.
1. Introduction
Traditionally, spectrum has been allocated by regulatory
agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in a static and ineﬃcient manner. All frequencies
below 3 GHz are assigned to specific services which operate
under license leading to a lack of spectrum for new wireless
applications. However, recent studies show that most of the
time, the allocated spectrum is vastly underutilized.
In this context, Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs)
emerge as a possible solution to solve the lack of spectrum,
allowing to take profit of unused frequency bands and
to improve the overall availability of the data. CRNs are
composed of smart devices which can sense and identify
“white spaces”—or vacant areas—in the spectrum. Based
on current measurements and on that learnt in the past,
such devices can intelligently adjust their transmission
parameters, giving the opportunity to secondary users to
make use of the spectrum left unused by licensed services or
primary users. However, as primary transmissions must not
be interfered, a CRN must continuously sense the medium
[1] in order to detect the presence of a primary user or
incumbent in the current band in use. In this case, the
CRN must rapidly switch to another channel (perform a
frequency handoﬀ), leading to the temporal interruption of
the CRN connections until a new channel is available. The
interval of time needed until connections are resumed, that
is, the handoﬀ duration, will obviously vary depending on
the number of available channels and the detection time, but
typically can take values around 2 seconds [2].
The particular attributes of CRNs such as cooperative
spectrum sensing, incumbent- and self-coexistence mech-
anisms, and so forth, raise new security implications [3,
4]. Mainly the literature has focused on three specific
attacks: the Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack, the
Objective Function Attack (OFA), and the specific attacks to
cooperative sensing mechanisms.
The PUE attack, first coined in [1], is based on the fact
that CRN devices or secondary users are only allowed to
operate in licensed bands on a noninterference basis. An
attacker could pretend to be an incumbent by transmitting
a signal with similar characteristics to a primary signal, thus,
preventing secondary users from using vacant bands.
OFAs [3] are targeted to disrupt the learning algorithm of
Cognitive Radios (CR) devices. Within a CRN, incumbents
control several radio parameters in order to enhance network
performance. The parameters choice is often done by means
of an artificial intelligence algorithm that makes slight
modifications of several input factors to find their optimal
values that maximize an objective or goal function. An
attacker can alter the performance of the learning to its
own profit by intentionally degrading (e.g., by jamming) the
2 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
channel when some input factors are greater than a certain
threshold. As a naı¨ve example, the attacker can jam the
channel whenever the security of the protocol is set, and
hence the learning algorithm will conclude that it is better
to work without any security.
Cooperative sensing in CRNs [5, 6] allows taking a
decision about the presence of a primary user in a given
channel, based on the reports provided by a set of CRs.
Each secondary user senses the spectrum individually and
shares its results with the rest of the nodes in order to
improve detection probability. As a consequence, malicious
and selfish behaviors can arise, such as a malicious node
which deliberately report false measurements leading to
false positives or negatives or a selfish node, which do not
cooperate in order to save energy, for instance.
In this paper, we first detail the Lion attack, a cross-layer
attack specific to CRNs performed at the physical link layer
and targeted to the Transport Control Protocol (TCP), and
we introduce some potential countermeasures. Furthermore,
we derive an analytical model for such attack, and we
evaluate its impact both by means of simulations and with
the provided analytical model. The attack, originally outlined
in [7], consists of performing a PUE in order to force the
CRN network to switch from one band to another (frequency
handoﬀ) with the aim of degrading the throughput of TCP
connections within the CRN. This attack can turn into a
permanent Denial of Service (DoS) if the attacker can predict
or know the new transmissions parameters to be used by the
sender after the handoﬀ. If each time the sender switches to a
new frequency and the attacker performs a PUE, the sender
will not be able to send any data successfully.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a
detailed description of the attack and a set of countermea-
sures to mitigate its eﬀects. Next, in Section 3, we present
an analytical model of such attack. Section 4 analyzes the
eﬀect of the attack on TCP throughput via simulation and
validates the analytical model presented in the previous
section. Finally, in Section 5, we present the conclusions of
the work.
2. The Lion Attack
2.1. Target and Motivation. The Lion attack is a cross-layer
PUE-based attack targeted to the transport layer, aiming
at degrading the throughput of TCP connections within a
CRN. PUE attacks allow the attacker to easily force frequency
handoﬀs which, as explained below, could have a harmful
impact over the TCP throughput. The Lion attack uses PUE
attacks to eﬀectively reduce the throughput. Moreover, if
the attacker knows or can guess some of the connection
parameters, He or she can even perform a DoS just by
emulating a primary transmission at specific instants of time
which can be easily predicted (see Section 2.2). Because
of this, the Lion attack is more cost eﬀective in reducing
TCP throughput that performing simple PUE attacks or just
jamming.
Although frequency handoﬀs could also be forced by
means of jamming, there are fundamental diﬀerences which
may incentivize an attacker to perform specifically a PUE and
not simply jam the channel.
First, a CRN is required to perform a frequency handoﬀ
upon detection of a primary transmission even if the next
channel in use has worse transmission conditions. With
jamming, the victim CRN may just perform the handoﬀ
if the overall transmission conditions are below a certain
threshold and another better frequency channel is available.
Moreover, the cost of a PUE is reduced to just transmit a
signal similar to a real primary signal (television or wireless
microphones) or replay a real one.
Second, with the same eﬀort or resources, the scope of a
PUE attack can be much larger. Although the fake primary
transmission may be detected in a small-scoped area of the
CRN, it will force a frequency handoﬀ, thus aﬀecting the
whole CRN. By means of jamming, a small area with just a
degraded communication channel should not be enough to
force the CRN to perform such handoﬀ.
From the previous arguments, an attacker has enough
reasons to use Lion as the best cost eﬀective attack in order to
degrade or even starve TCP throughput over CRNs.
2.2. Attack Insights. As it is well known [8], the TCP protocol
is especially sensitive to high variations of delay and band-
width, and therefore the interruption of the transmission
due to the frequency handoﬀ can lead to a very poor
performance. As the transport layer is not aware of the
interruption, the TCP sender keeps sending data which is
queued for transmission at lower layers. Thus, outstanding
TCP segments can be delayed or even lost if the queue
overflows during the process of spectrum handoﬀ, triggering
the TCP congestion control mechanisms.
TCP keeps a retransmission timer for each outstanding
segment whose value is set based on Round-Trip Time
(RTT) measurements performed along the connection. If
the retransmission timer for a given segment expires; that
is, a Retransmission Time Out (RTO) takes place and no
acknowledgment has been received, it is considered to be lost,
so the segment is retransmitted and the congestion window
is reduced to one segment, thereby reducing its throughput
[9]. The expiration of the retransmission timer can be due
to the lost of a segment but also to a sudden increase in the
RTT, for example, if there is a route change or, in the case of
CRNs, when a spectrum handoﬀ takes place.
Moreover, as the retransmission timer backs oﬀ (doubles
its value) with each unsuccessful retransmission attempt, the
TCP sender may remain inactive even after the frequency
handoﬀ has finished, since it is not allowed to transmit any
data until a retransmission timer expires. Figure 1 depicts the
eﬀect of the attack, considering an initial RTO of 200 ms.
A PUE is performed and after tD s; the CRN detects the
presence of a (fake) primary user and performs a frequency
handoﬀ with a duration of 1.5 s. During the handoﬀ, as
the channel is not available, the data sent by the TCP
sender is not acknowledged, leading to the expiration of
the retransmission timer. The first retransmission attempt
is performed 200 ms after the original transmission and,
since the handoﬀ has not finished, is unsuccessful. As
a consequence, the TCP sender backs oﬀ doubling its
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retransmission timer and tries to retransmit the segment
after 2 · RTO = 400 ms. All retransmissions matching a
handoﬀ interval will fail, triggering the backoﬀ mechanism.
In this example, the forth retransmission finally succeeds, but
the TCP sender has remained inactive for at least 15 ·RTO =
3 s.
The smart version of the Lion attack is based on the
knowledge of the value of the retransmission timer of a
TCP connection. In typical CRNs such as WRAN 802.22 [2],
the RTT value for in-network communications is around
some hundreds of microseconds. Although the value of the
retransmission timer is variable and depends on the RTT
estimations, most implementations use a minimum value
for the RTO of 100 ms or 200 ms, much higher than the
estimation of the RTT performed. This fact will lead the
TCP sender to make use of a fixed value for the RTO, which
will be doubled for each unsuccessful attempt. The attacker
can take advantage of this information to force handoﬀs
which coincide with the retransmission instants, therefore
completely starving the TCP source, as shown in Figure 2.
2.3. Mitigating the Lion Attack. As explained in Section 2.2,
a Lion attack forces the CRN to perform a frequency
handoﬀ, incurring a substantial delay until transmission is
resumed and degrading TCP throughput. With the purpose
of counteracting this attack, the CRN should be able: (1) to
detect its operation and to identify/locate the attacker and (2)
to provide with information about the disconnection to the
transport layer so as to minimize the impact of the attack on
the protocol.
Many cross-layer solutions have been proposed in the
literature [10–12] to deal with typical TCP problems in
wireless links, such as losses, drastic changes in routes, or
temporal lost of connectivity. These approaches make TCP
aware of what is happening at the physical link layers and
modify its behavior to react according to network conditions,
thus improving its performance. Among them, it is worth
mentioning Freeze-TCP [10], a TCP variant designed to
improve TCP performance in mobile environments where
temporal disconnections occur frequently. In Freeze-TCP,
the receiver is responsible for monitoring the signal strength
to predict disconnections and advertising a zero window
to the sender before the disconnection takes place. Upon
the reception of a zero-window size, the sender enters the
ZWP (Zero-Window Probe) mode, in which it “freezes” its
transmission parameters (congestion window, retransmis-
sion timers), and it cannot transmit any data. By means
of this mechanism, it is possible to avoid potential losses
and prevent the congestion window from dropping because
no retransmission timers expire during the handoﬀ. When
the connection is resumed, the receiver advertises a nonzero
window which allows the sender to continue its transmission.
A modified version of Freeze-TCP could be used in CRNs,
in which the TCP sender is responsible for freezing itself its
own parameters without the need of being warned by the
receiver, as it is the case in Freeze-TCP. Since within a CRN
all members share information about the channel, the sender
itself could predict the disconnection due to an incoming
frequency handoﬀ [7].
Notice that although the attacker knows the CRN is
freezing TCP connections during the handoﬀs, it cannot
take advantage of this information in order to improve the
attack. The fact is that freezing TCP parameters limits the
attacker to only degrade the TCP throughput, since there
are no transmissions during the handoﬀ time. However, if
the attacker continues forcing frequency handoﬀs, it can
produce a permanent DoS attack. In order to avoid it, the
CRN must prevent the attacker from rapidly detecting the
next spectrum band to be used. Assuming the attacker is also
a CR device, it can predict the next frequency in two ways: (1)
through sensing and (2) by obtaining this information from
the CRN common control channel. Notice that the common
control channel provides the attacker with a priori knowl-
edge of the next operation channel, while sensing requires
a given amount of time until the attacker discovers the new
channel. Consequently, securing the control channel should
be incorporated by default in any CRN technology [4]. The
802.22 workgroup is dealing with such risk and the current
draft [13] defines a security sublayer to provide features such
as authentication, authorization, message integrity, and data
encryption for data and control channels.
All the previously presented countermeasures can par-
tially mitigate the eﬀects of the Lion attack but cannot stop
it at all since it cannot eﬀectively deal with DoS or channel
degradation due to jamming. Therefore, a parallel system
for finding the attack source such as Intrusion detection
systems (IDS) is necessary. IDSs in CRNs should monitor
other devices for intentional deviation from protocol, that
is, misbehavior, detecting which nodes are suspicious or
malicious. Several IDS approaches [14–16] could be some-
how applied but their particularization to CRNs is still
challenging. However, dealing with an IDS for CRNs is out
of the scope of this paper.
3. Analytical Model
As explained in Section 2, a Lion attack can degrade the
throughput of a TCP connection, leading in some situations
to the starvation of the TCP source. In this section, we
derive an analytical expression both for the average inactivity
time of a TCP source and the reduction of the throughput
due to the attack. It is important to remark that presented
model is just an approximation, that is, neglecting many
marginal contributions. Its accuracy is nevertheless proved
by comparing the results with simulated ones in Section 4.
3.1. Mathematical Background. Let Sk as in expression (1) be
the sum of k ∈ N independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables Xi, i ∈ [1, k] ⊆ N, with probability
density function (pdf) as in (2) and cumulative distributed
function (cdf) as in(3)
Sk = X1 + X2 + · · · + Xk =
k∑
i=1
Xi, (1)
fSk (t) =
(
fX1 ∗ fX2 ∗ · · · ∗ fXk
)
(t), (2)
FSk (t) =
∫
fSk (t)dt. (3)
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Figure 1: Lion attack.
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Figure 2: Smart Lion attack.
Lemma 1. Given Sk as in (1), the probability of only and no
more than k ∈ N events occurring within the interval (t, t+ τ],
t ≥ 0, τ > 0 ∈ R is
Pr(k events in (t, t + τ]) = FSk (τ)− FSk+1 (τ). (4)
Proof. Let us denote by A = {Sk+1 : Sk+1 ≥ τ}, B = {Sk :
Sk ≤ τ} and C = {Sk : Sk > τ}. The probability of only and
no more than k ∈ N events occurring within the interval
(t, t + τ] can be expressed as the probability of A∩ B.
As A = (A∩ B)∪ (A∩ C), being
Pr(A) = Pr(Sk+1 ≥ τ) = 1− FSk+1 (τ),
Pr(A∩ C) = Pr(C) = Pr(Sk > τ) = 1− FSk (τ),
(5)
then
Pr(A∩ B) = Pr(A)− Pr(A∩ C) = FSk (τ)− FSk+1 (τ). (6)
3.2. Assumptions. In order to develop the model, the follow-
ing assumptions have been adopted.
(i) A malicious user performs several attacks, each one
leading to a frequency handoﬀ.
(ii) The duration of a handoﬀ, which we denote by tH is
fixed.
(iii) The time needed in order to start a handoﬀ after the
CRN detects the presence of a primary user (channel
detection time) is fixed with value tD.
(iv) The time since the end of a frequency handoﬀ until
the attacker performs the next attack is modeled by a
random variable. Accordingly, we define Xi as a set of
i.i.d. random variables (see Figure 3) and X ′i = Xi +
tD + tH as i.i.d. random variables that represent the
time since the end of a handoﬀ until the end of the
next one. As a result, we can define S′k as a random
variable being the sum of k ∈ NX ′i as in (7) with pdf
and cdf as in (8), being Sk the sum of k ∈ NXi as in
(1)
S′k =
k∑
i=1
X ′i , (7)
fS′k = fX′1 ∗ fX′2 ∗ · · · ∗ fX′k
= fX1 ∗ fX2 ∗ · · · ∗ fXk ∗ δ(t − k(tD + tH))
= fSk (t − k(tD + tH)),
FS′k (t) = FSk (t − k · (tH + tD)).
(8)
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 5
(v) The round trip time is always smaller than the
minimum RTO of the TCP source RTOmin. As ex-
plained in Section 2, this can be assumed in CRNs
such as 802.22 networks. With each unsuccessful
attempt the RTO value is doubled until a maximum
value RTOmax that it is the RTO by a power of 2. As
a result, the value of RTO for the ith retransmission
can be expressed as in (9) and set of possible
retransmission instants ti defined as in (10)
RTOi =
⎧
⎨
⎩
2i−1 · RTOmin if i ≤ imax,
RTOmax if i > imax,
imax = log2RTOmax + 1,
RTOmax = 2imax−1 · RTOmin,
(9)
ti =
⎧
⎨
⎩
RTOmin if i = 1,
ti−1 + RTOi if i > 1
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(
2i − 1) · RTOmin if i ≤ imax,
(i− imax + 2) · RTOmax − RTOmin if i > imax.
(10)
(vi) As shown in Figure 3, we assume that it always takes
place at least one handoﬀ (handoﬀ 0). Considering
that the first segment loss takes place at the beginning
of the handoﬀ 0, the retransmissions attempts at ti <
tH will fall within this handoﬀ and therefore will
always fail, implying Pr(t = ti) = 0. For the sake of
clarity, we define a new time axis t′ = t− tH , and thus
we redefine the retransmission instants as t′l = ti− tH
being t′1 = ts − tH with s the index of the first ti
satisfying the condition ti > tH . As a result l is defined
as i− s + 1 for i ≥ s.
3.3. Probability of k Handoﬀs in Interval (t′, t′ + τ]. The
probability pk(τ) that k handoﬀs occur in the interval (t′, t′+
τ] is the probability of k events of the random variable X ′i
in interval (t′, t′ + τ + tH] (see Figure 3). Therefore, from
Lemma 1, pk(τ) can be expressed as in
pk(τ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1− FS′1 (τ + tH) if k = 0,
FS′k (τ + tH)− FS′k+1 (τ + tH) if k > 0.
(11)
3.4. Probability that a Given Instant t′ Coincides with the kth
Frequency Handoﬀ. Let hk(t′) be the probability function
that a given instant t′ coincides with the kth frequency
handoﬀ given that k handoﬀs have occurred. An expression
for hk(t′) can be easily obtained from Figure 3 as in
hk(t′)|k>0 = Pr
(
S′k − tH ≤ t′ ≤ S′k
)
= Pr
(
t′ ≤ S′k ≤ t′ + tH
)
= FS′k (t′ + tH)− FS′k (t′).
(12)
3.5. Probability that the Inactivity Time Is a Given Value. Let
T be the inactivity time of a TCP source, that is, the time
from the beginning of a frequency handoﬀ until the TCP
source successfully transmits a segment. Consequently, T is
the sum of all the RTOs (explained in Section 3) expired
before a retransmission succeeds. Therefore, we can define
T as a discrete random variable with a set of possible values
ti defined as in (10).
The probability that T = ti is equal to the probability
that the instant of time t = ti does not fall within a handoﬀ
interval, given that the previous instants t = t j with j =
1 · · · i − 1 do fall within a handoﬀ interval. For example,
the inactivity time will be T = 15 · RTOmin whenever
retransmissions performed at instants t1 = RTOmin, t2 =
3·RTOmin and t3 = 7·RTOmin fail, because the connection is
not available due to a frequency handoﬀ, but the next attempt
at t4 = 15 · RTOmin succeeds.
Then, the probability Pr(T = ti) can be computed as in
(13), with kmax the maximum number of handoﬀs which can
take place during the interval [0, t′l ] as in (14) and kmin =
l′ −1 the minimum number of handoﬀs that must take place
during the interval [0, t′l ] in order to have an inactivity time
of ti, that is, the number of retransmission attempts that fail
at t′l−1, t
′
l−2, . . . , t
′
1 before the next one succeeds at instant t
′
l
Pr
(
T = ti = t′l + tH
)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− FS′1
(
t′l
)
if l = 1,
kmax(t′l )∑
k=kmin
pk
(
t′l
)
∗ ζ(1, 1, l, k) if l > 1,
(13)
kmax(t′) =
⌈
t′ − tD
tH + tD
⌉
, (14)
ζ
(
l, j, lmax, k
)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
mmax∑
m= j
(
hm
(
t′l
)
· ζ(l + 1,m + 1, lmax, k)
)
if l < lmax,
FS′k
(
t′l
)
if l= lmax, j ≤ k,
1 if l = lmax, j > k,
(15)
mmax =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
k − (lmax − l − 1) if k − (lmax − l −1) <kmax
(
t′l
)
,
kmax
(
t′l
)
, otherwise,
(16)
where k is the total number of handoﬀs to be performed
during the period (tH , t′l + tH); j − 1 the number of handoﬀs
already occurred until instant t′l−1; lmax− l−1, the number of
handoﬀs which must occur after t′l and coincide, each one of
them, with the following periods t′l+1, t
′
l+2, . . . reach t
′
lmax
; and
mmax− j + 1 the maximum number of handoﬀs that can take
place until instant t′l .
For the sake of clarity, let us suppose that we want to
compute Pr(T = ti = 6.2 s) for a given connection with
RTOmin = 0.2 s and tH = 1.5 s. The set of instants ti to
consider are t1 = 0.2 s, t2 = 0.6 s, t3 = 1.4 s, t4 = 3 s, t5 = 6.2 s.
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Figure 3: Analytical model for the Lion attack.
Assuming that the first handoﬀ is performed at t = 0, the
first retransmission attempt will take place at t = 0.2 s. Since
it will match the first handoﬀ it will fail, and the same will
happen for the next retransmissions attempts at t2 = 0.6 s
and t3 = 1.4 s (since ti < 1.5 s). A new attempt will take
place at t = 3 s when the first handoﬀ has ended, but in
order to have an inactivity time of T = ti = 6.2 s, this
retransmission should fail too. Otherwise, the inactivity time
would be T = t4 = 3 s.
Since the first instant satisfying ti > tH is ti = t4, now we
can define t′1 = t4 = 3 s and t′2 = t5 = 6.2 s, since Pr(T =
ti) = 0 for the previous instants. Then,
Pr
(
T = ti = 6.2 s = t′2
)
=
kmax∑
k=kmin
pk
(
t′l
)
∗ ζ(1, 1, l, k) =
3∑
k=1
pk
(
t′2
)∗ ζ(1, 1, l, k)
= p1
(
t′2
)∗ ζ(1, 1, 2, 1) + p2
(
t′2
)∗ ζ(1, 1, 2, 2)
+ p3
(
t′2
)∗ ζ(1, 1, 2, 3)
(17)
with kmin = 1, since at least one handoﬀ must take place
at t′1 = 3 s and kmax = 3, which can be easily obtained
through (14).
If there is only one handoﬀ during the interval (tH , t′i ), it
must coincide with t′1 = 3 s, and therefore
ζ(1, 1, 2, 1) =
1∑
m=1
hm
(
t′1
) · ζ(2, 2, 2, 1) = h1
(
t′1
)
. (18)
If there are two handoﬀs during the interval (tH , t′i ), one
of them must coincide with t′1 = 3 s, and the second must
not coincide with t′2 = 6.2 s; otherwise, the time of inactivity
would be longer than t′2 = 6.2 s. Then,
ζ(1, 1, 2, 2) =
1∑
m=1
hm
(
t′1
) · ζ(2, 2, 2, 2) = h1
(
t′1
)∗ FS′2 . (19)
Finally, if there are three handoﬀs during the interval
(tH , t′i ), at least one of them must coincide with t
′
1 = 3 s and
the last one must not coincide with t′2 = 6.2 s. Accordingly,
ζ(1, 1, 2, 3) =
1∑
m=1
hm
(
t′1
) · ζ(2, 2, 2, 3) = h1
(
t′1
)∗ FS′3 . (20)
3.6. Calculation of the TCP Source Inactivity Time after a
Handoﬀ Occurs. Since T is a discrete random variable with
a set of possible values ti defined as in (10) with probabilities
Pr(T = ti) as in (13), the expected average time of TCP
source inactivity T after receiving an attack can be obtained
as in
T =
∞∑
i=1
ti · Pr(T = ti). (21)
3.7. Obtaining the TCP Inactivity Percentage due to the Lion
Attack. We can assume an inactivity percentage Uinactivity as
in (22), or, the other way round, the percentage Uactivity as in
(23) which shows the reduction of the throughput due to an
attack with respect to the transmission time without the Lion
attack.
Uinactivity (%) = T
T + A
× 100, (22)
Uactivity (%) = A
T + A
× 100, (23)
T , defined as in (21), is the average inactivity time of the TCP
source due to the attack derived in the previous section.
The average activity time A is the mean time since the
end of a frequency handoﬀ until the next one starts and can
be computed as in
A = E[Xi + tD] = E[Xi] + tD. (24)
4. Model Validation
With the purpose of validating the model proposed in
Section 3, we have conducted a set of simulations with the
ns-2 simulator [17]. The inactivity time of a TCP connection
due to the Lion attack is computed and compared to the
results provided by the model, which has been programmed
in matlab [18].
The presented simulation results reflect the impact of
the Lion attack on TCP throughput both when the victim
source freezes TCP parameters and when it does not. Neither
IDS countermeasures nor the use of unsecure control data
are simulated. The rationale behind this is that with an
IDS eﬃciently operating within the CRN, the attack has no
impact since fake primary transmissions will be detected,
and thus the CRN will not switch to another channel.
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 7
802.22
base
station
User 1 User 2
TCP connection
33
km
15
km
15km
Figure 4: Simulation environment.
Furthermore, if the victim network uses an unsecure control
channel, the attacker can easily get the next operational
channel and perform a DoS. In this case, simulation results
are of little value since we would get just a flat zero
throughput.
4.1. Simulation Scenario. Figure 4 depicts the simulated
environment, consisting of a TCP connection between two
secondary users of an 802.22 CRN. As 802.22 specifica-
tions define spectral eﬃciencies ranging from 0.5 bit/(s/Hz)
to 5 bit/(s/Hz), considering a mean of 3 bits/(s/Hz), we
have assumed a network transmission capacity of 18 Mbps
(6 MHz TV channel) [2]. Given that 802.22 standard defines
a signal coverage of up to 33 Km for 4 W CPE EIRP, we have
assumed an average distance between both secondaries and
the base station of 15 Km and thus a propagation delay of
50μs (speed of light). The process delay at the base station
has been neglected and, in order to just reflect the eﬀects of
the handoﬀs on the throughput, also the bit error rate (BER).
The attacker must sense the medium in order to detect
the next channel to be used by the CRN after the handoﬀ.
Assuming 45% of the TV channels in use, there are 36
free unlicensed channels for CRN operation (out of 67 TV
channels available in the UHF and VHF bands). Primary
transmissions should not be interfered, so at least there must
be 2 empty channels between every pair of TV channels in
use [2]. This fact reduces the amount of available channels
for CRN operation to 12. Considering a channel sensing
time of 46.95 ms [19] for detecting the occupation of a
given channel, it will take to the attacker (12/2) · 46.95 ms
= 305.175 ms in average to discover the new CRN operation
channel.
From the previous reasoning, we have modeled the time
since the end of a handoﬀ until the next attack begins,
as an exponential random variable with mean 1/λ =
305.175 ms. Although to get more realistic results other
random distributions could be more suited, we have selected
an exponential distribution for ease of computation. Notice
that the sum of k of exponential random variables, that is,
the base of the analytical model, can be easily computed as a
gamma distribution.
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of the lion attack on TCP throughput freezing and
nonfreezing TCP transmission.
After the CRN receives the attack by means of a PUE, it
takes tD s to detect the fake primary transmission and stop
transmissions at PHY/MAC layer (channel move time). We
have set a typical value for this parameter of tD = 500 ms [2].
The handoﬀ duration is also set to a typical value of tH = 1.5 s
[2].
The TCP sender is fed by an FTP source which generates
TCP segments of 1040 bytes with two diﬀerent implementa-
tions of TCP: standard TCP Reno and the proposed modi-
fication of TCP Reno (see Section 2.3). The only diﬀerence
between them is that the later freezes congestion control
parameters, that is, congestion window and threshold, as
well as the retransmission timers whenever a handoﬀ occurs
(handoﬀ beginning is provided by lower layers), resuming
the transmission when the handoﬀ ends (handoﬀ end also
provided by lower layers). On the contrary, standard TCP
Reno is not aware of lower layers and thus continues
transmitting during a handoﬀ so, if the handoﬀ lasts
long enough, the retransmission timer expires for pending
segments. This fact, as previously stated in Section 2.2, can
imply long inactivity times. Taking into account that the RTT
value for this scenario is much below 100 ms (see expression
(26)), as afore mentioned a minimum retransmission time
out of RTOmin = 200 ms has been adopted. Furthermore, a
maximum value of RTOmin = 12.8 s (default TCP value in
the simulator ns-2).
4.2. Simulation Results. Figures 5 and 6 represent the eﬀects
of the Lion attack on TCP throughput when using standard
TCP Reno and TCP Reno with parameters freezing whenever
a handoﬀ occurs. In Figure 5, the attacker senses the media
until it detects the new CRN operation channel and performs
a new PUE. In Figure 6, handoﬀs are performed matching the
retransmission attempts of the TCP sender.
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of the smart lion attack on TCP throughput
freezing and nonfreezing TCP transmission.
Figures 5 and 6 clearly show that TCP throughput is
higher when freezing TCP parameters than without freezing,
since the TCP source remains inactive just during the
handoﬀs and makes the most of the available transmission
time. However, standard TCP continues transmitting seg-
ments during the handoﬀs, leading to the expiration of the
retransmission timers. This fact reduces TCP throughput
because of two causes: (1) congestion window is reduced to 1
segment; and (2) every time a segment is retransmitted, the
retransmission timer is doubled (until it reaches a maximum
value). The latter increases the inactivity time, since the
TCP sender is not allowed to transmit any data until the
next retransmission timer expires. The former almost does
not aﬀect our CRN since the optimal window value for the
connection is, as show in expression (26), just one segment.
RTT = ttx + 2tprop ≈ 641μs, (25)
Wopt
(
segments
) = RTT
ttx
≈ 1.42. (26)
As stated in (10), the time between consecutive retrans-
missions for a given segment is doubled with each unsuc-
cessful attempt. Because of this, if a segment transmission
fails at t = 0, the corresponding retransmission attempts will
take place at t = [0.2 s, 0.6 s, 1.4 s, 3 s, . . .]. In Figures 5 and
6, the retransmission attempts are represented as red arrows
if the link is not available (and therefore the retransmission
fails) and as green arrows otherwise. The handoﬀ intervals
are represented with a light red background. For example,
Figure 5 shows that the first handoﬀ takes place at t = 0.5 s
with a duration of 1.5 s. The first retransmission is performed
200 ms after the beginning of the handoﬀ, at t = 0.5 s +
0.2 ms = 0.7 s, before the end of the handoﬀ. The next take
place at t = 0.7 s + 0.4 s = 1.1 s and t = 1.1 s + 0.8 s = 1.9 ms,
Table 1: Average activity time, average inactivity time and percent-
age of inactivity.
λ (ms)
Non Freezing TCP Freezing TCP
A(s) T(s) Uinactivity (%) A(s) T(s) Uinactivity (%)
3.28 0.54 17.03 96.92 0.9 1.5 62.34
2 0.70 17.35 96.07 1.11 1.5 57.41
1 1.12 11.7 91.21 1.62 1.5 47.96
as well within the period of handoﬀ. At t = 0.5 s + 1.5 s = 2 s
the first handoﬀ ends, but the TCP sender remains inactive
(waiting for the expiration of the retransmission timer) until
time t = 1.9 s + 1.600 s = 3.5 s. By that time, the attacker has
forced another handoﬀ, and therefore the retransmissions
fails again until time t = 3.5 s + 3.2 s = 6.7 s, which finally
matches up with a period of communication, and therefore it
succeeds. However, as it can be observed, the TCP connection
(without freezing) has been inactive around 6.2 seconds.
On the other hand, Figure 6 shows an example of the
smart Lion attack. In this case, the attacker can detect the new
operational channel through local sensing and predicts the
retransmission timer values, forcing the handoﬀs to coincide
with the retransmissions attempts. The figure clearly shows
that the throughput is null for standard TCP. However,
freezing parameters makes the smart attack even less eﬀective
than the standard attack.
Table 1 reflects the percentage of inactivity Uinactivity of
the TCP source when the attacker performs several attacks
(see expression (23)), considering both TCP implemen-
tations. The time since the end of a handoﬀ until the
next begins follows an exponential distribution with mean
ranging from 305 ms to 1 s. In addition, it provides the
percentage of activity when the attacker performs a smart
attack.
The results clearly show the degradation of TCP through-
put when a Lion attack is received. Obviously the more
frequent are the attacks, the bigger the negative impact on the
TCP source. However, freezing TCP transmission parameters
can deal with the standard attack, allowing the TCP sender
to transmit whenever the channel is available. With regard
to the smart attack, freezing TCP parameters during the
handoﬀ avoids unnecessary retransmissions, leading to a
higher activity percentage of time. As the attacker forces
handoﬀs only at potential instants of retransmissions (each
time more infrequent), the TCP sender can transmit during
a longer interval of time.
4.3. Analytical Model Results. The analytical model described
in Section 3 has been programmed in matlab and run with
the parameters given in Section 4.1. Table 2 provides the
average inactivity time T and inactivity percentage Uinactivity
obtained for the analytical model in comparison with the
results obtained via simulation.
Note that the model derived is valid for any probability
distribution, so it can be used to analyze diﬀerent attack
patterns. Accordingly, it can be used to study the impact on
TCP connections of other phenomena, such as for example
noise, by choosing the right distribution.
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Table 2: Analytical model versus simulation.
λ (ms)
Simulation Analytical model
A(s) T(s) Uinactivity (%) A(s) T(s) Uinactivity (%)
3.28 0.54 17.03 96.92 0.305 16.03 98.13
2 0.70 17.35 96.07 0.5 16.61 97.08
1 1.12 11.7 91.21 1 11.6 92.06
5. Conclusions
Cognitive Radio Networks arise as a promising solution to
share and take advantage of the scarcity of radio spectrum as
well as to enhance the overall availability of transmitted data.
These networks are composed of smart devices that “intel-
ligently” select the best spectrum opportunities. Although
CRNs make use of existing technologies, their particular
characteristics pose new security challenges and can increase
the complexity of other known attacks.
In this paper, we have detailed the Lion attack, originally
outlined in [7] and its potential countermeasures. The
Lion attack is a cross-layer attack to CRNs performed at
the physical link layer and targeted to TCP that relies on
emulating a licensed transmission in order to force a CRN to
perform frequency handoﬀs. Connections within the CRN
are interrupted during the handoﬀs, thus reducing TCP
throughput. Proper election of when to force a handoﬀ
can even starve at all the TCP throughput. With the aim
of mitigating this attack, we have first described some
modifications to the TCP protocol in order to avoid the
degradation of the throughput due to frequency handoﬀs. In
this way, CRN devices will be able to freeze TCP connection
parameters during frequency handoﬀs and adapt them to
the new network conditions after the handoﬀ. Second, we
have also addressed the need for securing the control data in
order to prevent the attacker from eavesdropping current and
future actions of the CRN, and we have denoted the necessary
use of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) specifically adapted
to CRNs.
The main contribution of this paper is the evaluation of
the impact of the Lion attack on TCP performance through
an analytical model. The model provides an expression
for the average time of inactivity of a TCP sender due to
the attack and also the percentage of inactivity, parameters
which measure the impact of the attack on TCP throughput.
Moreover, the model has been validated through simulations
considering two implementations of TCP: the standard TCP
Reno and the modified version proposed to mitigate the
eﬀects of the attack. The results obtained show that freezing
TCP parameters reduces the eﬀect of the handoﬀs (caused by
the attack) on the throughput of TCP. Moreover, the smart
version of the attack prevents it from leading to a DoS.
Further work is needed in order to analyze how the attack
can be mitigated by means of an IDSs. Its use may avoid
unnecessary handoﬀs due to fake primary transmissions, but
it will also lead to false negative and/or positives that could
take the network to continue forcing unnecessary handoﬀ for
the former and to illegally perform for the later. Although
we strongly believe that IDS can be eﬀective in dealing with
the attack; its impact on network performance should also be
studied in depth.
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